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Only connect: comparative, national, and global history 





What do we, as historians of Asia, do history of science or technology for?  Are 
we aiming to enhance the national or regional prestige of parts of the world that 
are usually treated as bit-players by the mainstream discipline? Or seeking to 
investigate non-Western forms of scientific or technological practice – how a 
society built and understood and attempted to control the world it inhabited 
(since we can think of science and technology as universal at least in that sense) 
– in order better to understand a particular period of the past in a particular 
place? Are we interested in using the past to serve the present? Or in using the 
strange to question the familiar? Are we interested in integrating non-Western 
facts, or dynamics, into a broader picture of how the world has evolved over 
time? Or in generating new historiographical heuristics? 
 
Like me, many readers of this essay will have tried to insert their knowledge of 
specific local cases into broader frameworks, whether they be national or 
regional history, world history, global history or comparative history. In doing 
so we might presume that historians of science and technology working in these 
different fields easily engage in dialogue, and see their work as part of a 
common cumulative project. Yet on closer examination we see that it is often 
extremely difficult to communicate productively across the boundaries of the 
genres. Their agendas are marked off by distinctive presuppositions, research 
questions and interpretative frameworks. Sometimes it almost seems that 
historians in the various fields are looking at completely different worlds. So 
what exactly are we embarking on if we wish to work across and between the 
fields?  
 
I have recently been prompted to reflect more rigorously than has been my 
custom on these questions by an invitation to contribute a chapter on 
‘Technological Transformations’ to the ‘Early Modern Era’ volume of the 
Cambridge World History.1 Both the proposed chapter title, and the dates 
attached to the period covered, “roughly” 1400-1800 according to the 
prospectus, fit neatly with the familiar narrative that depicts Europe 
consolidating its position through these centuries as a red-hot crucible of 
historical change, a story of carracks and cannon, of gear-wheels and steam-
power, great inventors and patents, an invincible sequence of innovations that 
built the foundation for the modern colonial and industrial world-order, and 
stemmed from the West’s unique technological creativity and economic 
dynamism. Clearly if I, as a historian of China, had been invited to contribute the 
chapter on technology to this volume, it was because the editors wanted 
something rather different. Yet technology as we commonly define it today is 
                                                        
1 Edited by Jerry H. Bentley and Sanjay Subrahmanian. 
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both the midwife and the product of our modern, machine-made world. Could or 
should my chapter avoid taking the teleologies of modernity and the emergence 
in eighteenth-century Europe of what Joel Mokyr (2010) calls “Industrial 
Enlightenment” as its central theme, and as the point of reference for discussion 
of other societies?  
 
This prompted me to ask whether world history in itself offers a satisfactory 
alternative to Eurocentrism. Over the last decade or so, earlier Eurocentric 
accounts have been reworked to develop much more inclusive narratives of how 
the modern world order was formed and constituted, arguing – and often 
successfully demonstrating – that the birth of the modern world is best 
understood not as an inevitable triumph of European intellectual superiority 
and exceptional capacities for invention, but as a ‘series of transformations in 
which most of the people of the world participated, and to which most of them 
contributed, not simply as the objects or victims of the successes of others, but 
actively, independently and creatively’ (R.I. Moore 2003: xxi). Nevertheless, 
despite Joseph Needham’s best efforts, there are still many obstacles to 
integrating science into world-history narratives of complex flows and mutual 
influence,2 although in the case of technology it is often feasible to demonstrate 
early-modern influences on as well as from Europe. Good examples include 
military technologies and ‘global’ commodities like cotton textiles or porcelain 
(e.g. Pacey 1991; Riello & Parthasarathi 2009; Finlay 2010). In these domains 
many key technological breakthroughs occurred outside Europe, and well 
before the dates to which the ‘early modern’ era is usually assigned: in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, for example, for new regimes of warfare and 
defence organized around the use of gunpowder weaponry (e.g. Lorge 2008). 
 
The world history perspective thus disturbs the conventional Eurocentric 
periodization that locates the beginning of a distinctive early-modern era in 
about 1400. But it is transformations in Europe that define the end of the period. 
The terminal point of the early-modern era is sometimes identified as the 
decade between 1830 and 1840, the point at which a new system of industrial 
manufacturing had clearly arrived to stay in Britain. For world or global 
historians, an equally important and nearly coincidental marker and theme of 
inquiry, variously located between 1750 and 1850, is the “Great Divergence”, 
the point at which the nations of the West overtake their previous rivals like 
China, India and the Ottoman empire and accelerate far ahead in their capacity 
to accumulate wealth and power, and to extend their political control and 
intellectual dominance. 
 
From the perspective of history of science or technology, the presence of the 
Great Divergence, whether as a point of reference or as the immediate object of 
inquiry, means that the domains of activity that are considered significant are 
almost invariably restricted to those identified as having played key roles in 
early-modern global flows and in the formation of the modern West, its values 
and institutions. In the case of technology, historians typically investigate the 
                                                        
2 McClellan and Dorn (2006) are not unusual in drawing an epistemological line between real 
science (‘scientific theorizing’ in their terms), invented by the ancient Greeks, and what they call 
‘the useful sciences’, found in all human societies. 
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technical, economic and political dimensions of such activities as mining and 
textile production, ship-building and weaponry, and methods for recording and 
analyzing mechanical procedures. Movement and transformation are crucial 
markers of significance; progress, or at the very least success in displacing other 
ways of making and doing, inevitably lurks as a criterion for deciding how to 
interpret the outcome of encounters or patterns of change: this is a history that 
moves us forward. 
 
Such history seldom makes space for the cosmic, ritual or symbolic dimensions 
of technologies, or for their role in stabilizing and maintaining social systems. 
However rich in symbolic meaning technologies like building houses or weaving 
baskets or darning socks might have been, however indispensable they were to 
the pattern of the social fabric, to religious fulfilment or political cohesion, being 
identified with what Fernand Braudel called “the brakes” as opposed to “the 
accelerator” of history they find little place in these historical frameworks.  
 
‘The perspective of modern Western history and historians obfuscates a clear 
view of the Asian past,’ fulminates Peter Lorge (2008: 7). I agree, and one of my 
main objections is an anthropological one: the teleologies of modern or early 
modern history erase or ignore key forms of past experience that may well have 
been an essential part of existence for the members of the societies we are 
studying. Furthermore, they impoverish our attention to our own contemporary 
forms of experience, thus paradoxically disconnecting world history, which 
aspires to be inclusive, from many of today’s realities and concerns.  
 
Of course in drafting my contribution to the Cambridge World History I have no 
intention of giving in meekly to narratives that are defined by conceptions of 
historical progress, even the more encompassing narratives carved out within 
the new frameworks of World History that allow me room to show China and 
India, African farmers and Andean weavers, as significant historical actors. I also 
want to include other perspectives. I want, for instance, to convey some sense of 
what the technological culture (Bijker 2007) of late-Ming society looked like, 
which branches of technical activity were considered significant, why and by 
whom. One argument I have made along these lines is that we can learn a great 
deal about late imperial China by paying attention to the role of houses, how 
they were designed, how their occupants used them, and what these practices 
contributed to an evolving social order (Bray 1998). But how can this kind of 
argument or exploration be fitted into the dynamisms of world history, or – 
given that my story about houses in China starts in the eleventh century – into 
its periodizations? Will readers even accept that houses can be interpreted as 
technology? 
 
I realise that most of my readers probably work on later modern periods, when 
concepts like “science” and “technology” are already terms in common use, 
denoting consciously modern projects for the transformation of the world, the 
human condition, national status, power and wealth. Once we enter the 
nineteenth century, questions of periodization also seem less intractable: 
colonialism and imperialism draw the whole world into an overarching 
synchronicity within which local chronologies can be conveniently nested. But 
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perhaps thinking about an “early modern” period (with the assumption implicit 
in the term itself that by now societies are starting to fuse  or converge into a 
shared if frequently resisted progress towards something called “modernity”), 
and thinking about the challenges to inserting “science” and “technology” into 
the “history of the early modern period” as I do here, will serve to highlight 
some of the deeper challenges of translation, of foregrounding and 
backgrounding, of unsatisfactory periodization, that all of us have to cope with. 
 
The history of science or technology of anywhere or any group in the “modern” 
or contemporary world is inevitably comparative: what is going on in Japan, or 
Germany, or Sulawesi or Amazonia always has to be contextualized within a 
broader flow of what has become a power-laden trans-national field of 
knowledge production within which accuracy and truth, efficiency and 
originality are expected to be assessed. Even an anthropologist investigating 
plant knowledge among hunter-gatherers of Flores will be allocated a category 
within which to deploy, assess and evaluate that knowledge, namely “ethno-
botany” or “vernacular science”. So is the history of science actually ready for 
the world (Tilley 2010)? 
 
One of the major pitfalls for comparative or even global history of science and 
technology is that we take one side of the comparison as the norm against which 
to evaluate the other. (It is far more common to see ethno-botanies tested 
against botany than botanies against, or as, ethnobotanies.) Comparisons, 
furthermore, command most attention when they offer dramatic contrasts, and 
it is very easy and tempting to slide into a-historical, insufficiently contextual 
analysis. Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China enterprise (SCC) is 
an obvious example. Assessing the contribution of SCC to world history, Robert 
Finlay points out that Needham based the enterprise on assumptions that 
shaped it profoundly: SCC was a political, indeed utopian project to build a 
better world, based on a profound contrast: ‘China and the West are antithetical 
in their values and social dynamics’ (Finlay 2000: 267). Needham’s form of 
comparative history translates, Finlay remarks, into the construction of a 
“changeless” China. Needham’s decision to structure SCC as a set of parallel 
studies of different branches of knowledge and technique as they evolved over 
time, rather than as a history arranged according to dynasty, period or era, 
certainly helped entrench this a-historical approach.  
Yet, as Finlay notes, Needham’s arguments and interpretations, the image he 
constructs of China and of West vs Rest exchanges, have commanded the respect 
of  such prominent and innovative world historians as Fernand Braudel, Janet 
Abu-Lughod, Immanuel Wallerstein and André Gunder Frank. Knowing little or 
nothing of Chinese history themselves, such historians were enchanted, Finlay 
remarks scathingly, by uncontextualized and sometimes tendentious 
generalizations. The most influential of these was the ‘irresistible’ contrast that 
Needham painted between the Chinese and Portuguese voyages of discovery.  
For Needham, the voyages of Zheng He and Vasco da Gama in the fifteenth century 
reveal that when China and the West reached beyond their cultural borders, they did so 
as thesis and antithesis, the one promising peace and increase of knowledge, the other 
threatening the world with terrible consequences.  
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(Finlay 2000: 292)  
As Finlay notes, this contrast seems to ‘symbolize a crucial turning point in 
world history’ (ibid: 297).  
While one group of world historians took the supposed contrast as emblematic 
of the intrinsic violence and immorality of emergent capitalism, as well as a 
challenge to narratives that painted the rise of the West as unique and 
inexorable, for others, like David Landes, the picture painted by Needham of a 
Ming regime that terminated the voyages just when they might have started to 
bring some benefits beyond the pleasing spectacle of an imported giraffe, 
confirmed the static and incurious nature of imperial Chinese society, mired in 
eternal self-satisfaction and resistant to any idea of change. In Needham’s 
account imperial China is dynamic until around 1400 and stagnates thereafter, 
definitely an improvement on the Asiatic Mode of Production and its variants 
and antecedents. Yet the lure of the eternal essence is not confined to 
representations of Asia and the Other. Historians like Landes expound the 
trajectories of Europe or the West (the constant Us for so many comparative 
historians) very historically indeed, yet attribute to these dynamic, transmuting, 
hybrid entities a Promethean essence that determines their long-term historical 
evolution and characteristics. So is comparative history, or world history, an 
inherently a-historical enterprise?  
Nowadays some (but not all) comparative historians are much more 
sophisticated in the selection and definition of their terms of comparison. So 
what makes a good, effective comparison? Is it one that commands the interest 
of a broad readership, and ideally changes their understanding of the 
possibilities of interpretation, yet without resorting to over-simplification? 
Should we compare coeval societies, presuming a shared periodization? Or how 
else might we locate a significant domain or period of activity that can profitably 
be compared? It is really not easy, as the following examples suggest.  
A recent example of comparative history which I thoroughly enjoyed is an 
article by an art historian, Maarten Prak, comparing the construction methods 
used for large religious buildings across medieval Eurasia (Prak 2011). Prak 
takes Lothar Ledderose’s influential idea of modular construction (Ledderose 
2000) to apply it in mostly non-Chinese contexts:  
 
The building industry provides us with an opportunity to compare the application of 
cutting-edge technology under more or less identical circumstances across many 
different regions and cultures. It allows us, in other words, to identify the characteristics 
of the technological platforms for economic development available to the societies that 
are central to the debate on the ‘Great Divergence’.  
(Prak 2011: 382) 
 
In arguing for the importance across Eurasia of modular construction as a way 
to attain often huge scales in the absence of modern engineering science, Prak 
offers some suggestive insights – but alas, although very well read on Europe, 
Prak is much less informed on the non-European cases he discusses, which drift 
easily into a-historical, non-localized generalities.  
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So do we need an expert for each term of the comparison if it is to be usefully 
symmetrical, as in Lloyd and Sivin’s close collaboration in The Way and the Word 
(Lloyd & Sivin 2003)? One recent one-man exception to such lack of balance, 
and to the problems it poses for developing comparative history that offers 
strong rather than weak comparisons, is David Pankenier’s comparison of the 
reception of a planetary portent in sixteenth-century China and Europe. 
Focusing on the observation and interpretation of one event in two different 
societies, Pankenier provides insights, richly contextualized on both sides, into 
the very different Chinese and Western responses to such “millennial” events. 
Resisting the usual teleologies, he provides a sensitive and nuanced comparison 
between distinctive (yet internally complex) systems of thinking about time and 
pattern, asking how interpretations of unusual events are controlled or escape 
control within different structures of power (Pankenier 2009).  
Another fruitful avenue for comparative history might be to take up the concept 
of eras, as propounded by Thomas Misa in Leonardo to the Internet (Misa 2004). 
As Eda Kranakis notes in her review of the book, Misa’s approach to eras ‘draws 
on the tradition of political economy’ yet ‘takes an essential step beyond the 
myth of economic man’ (Kranakis 2005: 807). Misa identifies a sequence of eras 
whose time-frames do not always coincide with conventional historical 
divisions. They are characterized by key preoccupations or institutions, and 
Misa links each to a corresponding repertory of key technologies. Rather than 
arguing that technological developments drove the evolution of social and 
political institutions, ‘Misa’s model shows technical eras arising out of – and in 
relation to – specific political and cultural systems. This difference is 
fundamental, and Misa’s approach therefore provides new insights about the 
ways in which societies choose and use technologies’ (ibid: 209, emphases 
added). Technological choices, like the investigation of use and users, are 
analytical tools initially developed by anthropologists and STS scholars, but they 
also offer considerable scope to historians who might wish to look more closely 
at the technological cultures of past societies, or to think more imaginatively 
about the significance (symbolic, cultural, social or political as well as material, 
economic or epistemological) attributed to technologies within a historical 
context (Bray 2007).  
 
Thus Misa devotes an early chapter to “technologies of the court” in Renaissance 
Italy. His essay on Holland in the Golden Age portrays it as thoroughly capitalist 
but not industrial: its technical developments are better understood not as steps 
along a unilinear pan-European progress towards industrial mechanization, but 
rather as a spectrum of efforts to develop the technologies of commerce, in a 
network linking ship-building and financial tools with new processes for the 
refinement of sugar.  
 
Misa’s approach to eras reintegrates technology into mainstream historical 
concerns. It could also serve to build productive comparative approaches within 
the history of technology, and perhaps also in the history of science. Misa’s era 
of “technologies of the court”, for instance, immediately calls to mind Biagioli’s  
Galileo, Courtier (Biagioli 1993). It also prompts thoughts about how the uses 
Italian rulers made of technology compare to the technologies of court and state 
 7 
in ancien régime France (e.g. Mukerji 2009), or in early Qing China (Moll-Murata 
2005; Gugong bowuguan 2010), or between early Ming and early Qing China. 
 
This more ontological kind of comparison might allow us to escape from the 
compulsive teleologies of typical global or world history, obsessed as they still 
are with great divergences and convergences. In this vein I am working on a 
study of significant technologies in late imperial China, in which I hope to escape 
from the stranglehold of economisms by integrating the material and symbolic 
effects of technical practices, thus highlighting their contribution to government, 
both of the state and of the person (Bray forthcoming). I succeeded in 
convincing my editor that it was legitimate to write a book on technological 
cultures in China that did not to contribute to the debates on the Great 
Divergence except to argue that there were other histories of China to be told 
that were equally interesting and important. And yet comparison is an 
inevitable dimension of the project: how can one effectively identify the 
important specificities of Chinese historical experience except through 
comparison?  
 
We are used always to having “Europe” or “the West” as the obvious point of 
comparison or reference for any other society in world or global history. But 
must this necessarily be so? When it comes to the Cambridge World History, and 
to the early-modern era, could I surprise and educate my readers by using China 
as the touchstone for Europe, rather than the other way around? Could I develop 
a “story” that connects outward from China to other societies in Asia, Europe, 
the Americas, or will this simply bring me back in the end to a tale of European 
destiny? Perhaps, then, in order to resist conventional teleologies, and to give 
proper prominence to early modern contexts in which innovation and 
profitability were not the chief goals of material practice, I should simply craft a 
patchwork of exotic vignettes that would be good to think with?  
 
Twenty years ago Janet Abu-Lughod drew a distinction between world history, 
focusing on ‘disparate places’, and global history, focusing on ‘the linkages 
among places and the systematic nature of those linkages’ (Abu-Lughod 1991, 
18–23). When I queried my Cambridge editors to establish which model they 
had in mind the response was roughly ‘world, global, what’s the difference?’ 
Certainly there is no consensus these days on definitions or distinctions, 
suggesting perhaps that Abu-Lughod’s category of “world history” as an 
engagement with disparate places in practice represents no more than an 
enticing way to serve up chunks of national history. The manifesto of the Journal 
of World History, for example, declares that it is ‘devoted to historical analysis 
from a global point of view … [and] features a range of comparative and cross-
cultural scholarship and encourages research on forces that work their 
influences across cultures and civilizations’ (JWH 2012).  
 
Although they were reluctant to say so, however, it became clear in the course of 
our discussion of my abstract that what my Cambridge History editors actually 
expected from me was a study that would demonstrate some variant of the 
argument that ‘technology drives history’(Smith and Marx 1994). So is global or 
world or regional history necessarily about movement of knowledge, about 
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encounters between distinct sciences or technologies, about displacements 
where better knowledge prevails? Is this focus on dynamism the source from 
which good comparisons and critical reassessments spring?  
 
Sujit Sivasundaram, in an introduction to a 2010 Isis issue on global histories of 
science, notes that even local histories, histories that refuse grand narratives, 
still concentrate on ‘the conditions under which knowledge begins to move’ 
(2010a: 96). In his longer essay Sivasundaram offers two case studies (Ceylon 
and Oceania under imperialism) that examine collisions between worldviews, 
and between material cultures of knowledge inscription. Here we see blindness 
and refusals as well as mutual influences, malleability and mutual re-invention. 
Sivasundram follows recent trends in the history of science in emphasising 
networks, circulation, mediators and brokers – good ways to integrate science 
(or technology) into global history. Yet, Sivasundaram concedes, ‘mobility 
should not be stressed to the extent that immobility, disjuncture, and the 
workings of the local are forgotten’ (Sivasundaram 2010b: 158, emphasis added). 
But how to suture immobility (often achieved at considerable effort) into 
models built around mobility? 
 
Where, furthermore, do we locate the local? This remains a dilemma, as does the 
underlying issue of mobility as catalyst and historiographical trigger. In their 
introduction to Viet Nam: Borderless Histories, Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony 
Reid (2006) remind us of the many historians of Asian societies (Prasenjit Duara 
for China, Partha Chatterjee and other subaltern historians for India, Thai 
historians like Thongchai Winichakul) who want “the nation” out of history. 
Many advocate writing history ‘from the interstices of cultures, from the limits, 
the edges, the margins that are no longer marginal’ (ibid: 4). This approach has a 
proven efficacy in complicating the history of science and technology –examples 
might include the history of warfare as the advantages shifted back and forth 
within Asia and between Asia and Europe (Perdue 2005; Sun 2006; Casale 2010; 
Andrade 2011), or the evergreen theme of “Jesuit science” in China – which has 
the further advantage of fascinating and engaging historians of the West 
because Westerners are involved. 
 
But how might borderland studies fit into broader historical pictures? How do 
they fit with national or regional histories in the domain of science and 
technology, where state institutions and shared modes of literacy play such a 
key role in determining fields of activity as well as our sources? Is there room in 
world or global history for the complicated multi-stranded stories, stories 
usually without any clear ending or winner, that come out of borderland studies? 
Can world or global history accommodate non-linear comparisons, say between 
French and Manchu eras of technologies of the court, or offer any kind of 
intellectual added-value to self-contained case-studies of the place of science in 
Islamic thought, or of the importance of domestic architecture to the imperial 
Chinese social order? In short, is world history of science and/or technology a 
valid enterprise, or would we be better employed adding colourful new patches 
to the great quilt of what Abu-Lughod called the study of disparate places?  
 
 
